Safety, Health, Environment and Quality (SHEQ)

Organisational culture is the shared basic assumptions that are developed in an organisation as it learns and copes with problems. These are the basic assumptions that are taught to new members of the organisation as the correct way to perceive, think, act and feel. Culture is the sum total of a group’s learning and is demonstrated by its members’ values and behaviour.

In addition to a healthy organisational culture, each nuclear facility needs a strong safety culture. This is because of the special characteristics and unique hazards of the technology, eg radioactive by-products, concentration of energy in the reactor core, and decay heat.

Implied in the safety culture definition is the notion that:

• nuclear power plants are designed, built and operated to produce power in a safe, reliable and efficient manner;
• the concept of safety culture applies to every employee in the nuclear organisation, from the Board of Directors to the individual contributor;
  
• the focus is on nuclear safety, although the same principles apply to radiological safety, industrial safety and environmental safety; and
  
• nuclear safety is the first value adopted at a nuclear station and is never abandoned.

Principles for a strong safety culture

• Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety: Responsibility and authority for nuclear safety are well defined and clearly understood. Reporting relationships, positional authority, staffing and financial resources support nuclear safety responsibilities. Corporate policies emphasise the overriding importance of nuclear safety.
  
• Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety: Executive and senior managers are the leading advocates of nuclear safety and demonstrate their commitment both in word and action. The nuclear safety message is communicated frequently and consistently, occasionally as a stand-alone theme. Leaders throughout the nuclear organisation set an example for safety.
  
• Trust permeates the organisation: A high level of trust is established in the organisation, fostered, in part, through timely and accurate communication.
  
• Decision-making reflects safety first: Employees are systematic and rigorous in making decisions that support safe, reliable facility operation. Operators are vested with the authority and understand the expectation, when faced with unexpected or uncertain conditions, to place the facility in a safe condition. Senior leaders support and reinforce conservative decisions.
  
• Nuclear technology is recognised as special and unique: The special characteristics of nuclear technology are taken into account in all decisions and actions. Reactivity control, continuity of core cooling and integrity of fission product barriers are valued as essential, distinguishing attributes of the nuclear facility work environment.
  
• A questioning attitude is cultivated: Individuals demonstrate a questioning attitude by challenging assumptions, investigating anomalies and considering potential adverse consequences of planned actions. This attitude is shaped by an understanding that accidents often result from a series of decisions and actions that reflect flaws in the shared assumptions, values and beliefs of the organisation. All employees are watchful for conditions or activities that can have an undesirable effect on plant safety.
• Organisational learning is embraced: Operating experience is highly valued and the capacity to learn from experience is well developed. Training, self-assessments, corrective actions and benchmarking are used to stimulate learning and improve performance.
  
• Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination: Oversight is used to strengthen safety and improve performance. Nuclear safety is kept under constant scrutiny through a variety of monitoring techniques, some of which provide an independent “fresh look”.

Currently all nuclear power utilities in the United States are members of the INPO. One of the non-United States-based members is Koeberg Nuclear Power Station. In September 2006, PBMR joined more than 20 other nuclear suppliers as a member of the Institute’s Supplier Participant Advisory Committee (SPAC). Although not full INPO members, such as the utilities, the SPAC members convene twice a year and are invited to attend the annual conference hosted by the Institute’s chief executive officer.

Matters concerning the management of the nuclear technical environment, the challenges experienced, opportunities for influencing the regulatory environment and lessons learned are discussed and shared among the members at the SPAC meetings. Being a member of this committee allows PBMR access to the Institute’s data and documentation via a secure website. New contributions are made available on a weekly basis, which include large amounts of operational experience data, human performance and safety culture guidance documents, training material and learning opportunities. Specific opportunities for company directors, executives and senior managers are available to enhance their understanding of the special treatment that a nuclear organisation, supplier or plant requires. Opportunities vary from one-day work sessions and tutorials aimed at directors and senior managers to three-year liaison opportunities for technical employees at the Institute, all focusing on safe and responsible management of such plants.

In February 2008, PBMR hosted the Institute’s leadership courses aimed at entry level and middle management, and both PBMR and Eskom employees attended. A video titled “The Special Characteristics of Nuclear Power – A message for today’s nuclear professionals” was recently released by the Institute with the intent to be used as part of a safety culture enhancement programme sensitising employees to the special treatment required when managing and conducting nuclear business, design and operation. Planning is under way to ensure that continued and optimal learning is obtained from the opportunities on offer from the Institute.

In line with the PBMR philosophy of continuous improvement, an intervention has been developed to reinforce the questioning attitude and individual awareness of PBMR employees. It has been decided that a character should be established within the organisation that would be associated with the PBMR safety slogan. The mascot of the PBMR safety campaign is the safety hedgehog which, like the PBMR pebble, is tough on the outside, with a valuable kernel in the heart. Our hedgehog will help to educate us on the important aspects regarding safety, to ensure a safe workplace for all.

Safety culture and training form an integral part of PBMR’s training and development initiatives.

Induction and orientation training is conducted on a regular basis. As part of the overall induction course, Safety, Health, Environment and Quality (SHEQ) management awareness training was presented to new employees. In addition to this, a further SHEQ management presentation was given to employees in the Chief Executive’s induction training. This is a more detailed induction course presented by Executive Management for employees who have been in the Company for longer than three months.

Detailed orientation training was given to management and employees on the introduction to SHEQ management. PBMR has also embarked on a series of training sessions for engineering and management personnel on the quality and safety management requirements for the PBMR as stipulated by the NNR’s licence document.

Various international nuclear safety consultants have presented safety culture issues, such as personal attributes of a nuclear safety culture, a questioning attitude, accountability, promoting nuclear safety culture and the vital importance of sound communication channels in a nuclear environment.

• 100 000 man-hours accident-free.

• 100 000 man-hours accident-free.

• HPTU at the Potchefstroom campus of the NorthWest University: 10 139 total man-hours accident-free.
  
• The HTTF on the North-West University site: 8 510 total man-hours accident free.

• ensuring compliance of health and safety in all working environments;
  
• ensuring compliance of nuclear material safeguards;
  
• documenting environmental management strategy;
  
• implementing environmental management policy;
  
• ensuring resource awareness; and
  
• establishing operational performance management using best practice criteria.

The PBMR is an environmental-friendly way of electricity generation. It does not emit any carbon dioxide or other gases contributing to the effect of global warming like a fossil fuel power plant. The high net efficiency permits the reactor to eject 10% less waste heat to the surroundings compared to current operating nuclear power plants. PBMR is a proliferation-resistant reactor system with downstream opportunities to close the fuel cycle.

PBMR offers a unique solution to government relating to its objective of managing energy-related environmental and health impacts. Direct occupational health risks and global greenhouse issues can be mitigated through the appropriate use of nuclear energy.

Energy policy in South Africa is closely linked to environmental issues. In the PBMR context, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Framework for Considering Market Based Instruments to Support Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa (National Treasury) is of interest, and, in the CDM case, potential benefit to PBMR:

• CDM is a strategy based on the Kyoto Protocol to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by allowing industrialised countries to invest in projects that reduce emissions in developing countries. CDM could result in additional investment being available for activities in South Africa, which result in a less carbon-intensive economy.
  
• The national treasury framework is focused on introducing environmental taxes and charges to support sustainable development. Nuclear activities are specifically mentioned under ‘rehabilitation funds and guarantees’ in the context of nuclear power station decommissioning and treatment of spent nuclear fuel.

PBMR commits itself towards a clean and safe environment for all South Africans and subscribes to the NNR’s regulations in terms of nuclear safety. These include regulations on safety standards and provisions pertaining to the transportation of radioactive material, the disposal of radioactive waste, radiation protection and environmental monitoring and surveillance. Accordingly, it is necessary for PBMR to submit a safety case for approval before a nuclear installation licence can be issued.

Eskom, PBMR and the NNR have all agreed on a staged licensing process. The stages are:

• construction and installation;
  
• fuel to site/fuel load/initial criticality and power ascension;
  
• operation; and
  
• decommissioning.

PBMR successfully retained its ISO 9001 compliance certificate after an interim audit was performed by the accredited ISO 9001 certification body TUV Quality Services South Africa in November and December 2007. The scope of this activity was extended to include the PBMR Helium Test Facility at Pelindaba. The successful outcome of the certification audit resulted in the scope of the PBMR ISO 9001 compliance certificate being extended to include the operation of the HTF.

An Enterprise Improvement process was introduced in September 2007. This is a process of identifying, reporting and resolving non-conformances, events and opportunities for improvement. This is a company-wide process.

Various internal audits were conducted to verify the ability of PBMR to meet customer and regulatory requirements and to determine the effectiveness of the quality management system. The internal audit programme was fully implemented ensuring that every PBMR department was audited at least once during the year. A number of significant management and technical processes were also audited. The results of internal audits indicate that the quality management system is generally effective.

As a vehicle for continual improvement, PBMR is embarking on a programme of self-assessments. This is a process whereby a business unit analyses its performance, identifies its strengths and weaknesses and implements measures for improvement. A procedure has been established to document the self-assessment process.

PBMR revised its Quality Policy Manual to reflect decisions that were taken to resolve the suspension of the manufacturing order. The changes were mainly related to providing the assurance that interfaces between PBMR, Eskom and the NNR have been improved and are now effective.

PBMR’s client, Eskom, conducted four audits and four technical surveillances on PBMR to verify the effectiveness of the quality management system, which raised specific issues. The results of external audits provide opportunities for improving PBMR’s quality management system.

Successful compliance audits of strategic suppliers (international and national) for the manufacturing and development of the DPP were conducted. A total of 12 audits have been performed to verify compliance of our suppliers’ quality management systems with PBMR requirements. These audits raised some findings and corrective action is in progress.

The pebble bed reactor is designed to achieve passive safety though inherent design characteristics. One of the major design requirements is to ensure that the fission products will be retained in the fuel under the worst postulated accident, namely complete loss of coolant. As a result, the PBMR core is meltdown proof. This Generation IV technology is based on a concept that relies on the quality and design of the fuel, therefore geometry and materials are used to achieve passive safety under the most adverse conditions. It minimises the threat of proliferation and ensures the generation of clean energy.

The fundamental fuel element of the PBMR is a uranium dioxide (UO2) kernel of nominally 500 micron in diameter coated with essentially four layers which are carefully designed to contain the radioactive fission products produced during operation as well as during the most aggressive conditions following a total loss of helium coolant from the core. The layers around the kernel are firstly a porous carbon layer and then pyrolytic carbon, silicon carbon and pyrolytic carbon respectively. These coatings are each approximately 200 micron thick and are deposited in a chemical vapour deposition furnace. Although the silicon carbide layer is regarded as the main barrier against the release of fission products, the other layers are necessary to support and improve its functioning. In reality, these coating sets fulfil the role of micro containments of which there are nominally 6,8 x 109 in the PBMR core.

Besides the unique features of the fuel design, the PBMR core and core structures are designed to have a carefully selected geometry and are constructed from materials that aid the passive removal of heat following an event that resulted in a total loss of coolant from the core. The coolant (He) is an inert gas which is chemically and neutronically inert.

Standardisation of the modular design allows for lower production costs of the components, while modules could be joined to provide multiples of the 165 MW output per unit. The expected 24-month construction period is considerably less than that for conventional nuclear plants.

The pebble bed reactor operates at high temperatures (750 to 900 degrees Celsius), making it suitable for a range of applications besides electricity generation –typically process heat applications, especially in the chemical and petrochemical sectors, which are currently using fossil fuels. This will allow the traditional feedstock in these industries to be converted into usable product. It can also be used as a Very High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) to produce hydrogen when the hydrogen economy becomes a viable option.

It is fuel-efficient, achieving a higher burn-up per original mass of uranium in the fuel elements. Typically 42% can be expected for the PBMR core operating with 9,6% enriched uranium.